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Abstract
EU civilian missions are a tool to bridge new security gaps. They focus on security
problems that cannot be adequately addressed by military capabilities alone.
These missions operationalize the idea of liberal peace, ie the link between the
(democratic, liberal etc.) ‘quality’ of domestic institutions and international
peace. The purpose of these missions is to reform (or establish) a State security
sector based upon these qualities.
Taking the most advanced EU civilian mission to date, EULEX Kosovo, as an
object of study, this article examines a particular legal problem that ensues when
the rule of law is ‘exported’: in order to fulfil its rule of law-exporting task, the
mission enjoys broad executive powers. This, in turn, requires that the mission itself
must be bound by the principles it seeks to ‘export’. The rule of law serves, in other
words, both as a policy-tool and as a constraint for EULEX. As both dimensions
are connected, the failure of one will likely affect the performance of the other.
The article concludes that while the hybrid approach to the rule of law by
EULEX is a promising tool to address security gaps resulting from new threats in
post-conflict societies, the present weakness of the constraint function negatively
affects the performance of the mission as a whole.
1. Introduction
The idea that ‘public security’ can be exported by international actors is nothing
new.1 Beginning in the 1960s, public security-export has been an important
feature of the UN administration of territories.2 By means of UN missions,
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1 ‘Public security’ pertains to the management of risks attributable to the conduct of
non-state agents in relation to protected individual legal interests (eg life, health,
liberty, property) but also in relation to protected collective legal interests (eg the
functioning of public and civil society institutions).
2 An early UN mission in the Congo (ONUC), the UN Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM II) and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
built on this idea. See UNSC Res 143 (14 July 1960) UN Doc S/RES/4387, para 2;
UNSC Res 814 (26 March 1993) UN Doc S/RES/814, paras 12, 14; UNSC Res 1272
(25 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1272, paras 2(a), 3(a). On the international ad-
ministration of territories see generally, M Benzing, ‘International Administration of
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the international community exercised (to a varying degree) public security
powers that are normally assigned to the territorial State, eg the protection of
civilians (from physical violence), the disarmament of non-State actors, the pro-
tection of critical infrastructures, the maintenance of corrections facilities,
border management, etc.
Public security-export is not a UN monopoly. The EU followed the UN’s lead
in the beginning of the 2000s. Since then, the EU has acted as a security-exporter
by operating several civilian missions as a response to the emergence of newly
perceived security threats.3 In its 2003 Security Strategy, the EU diagnosed that
post-Cold War security threats are no longer of a purely military nature and
therefore cannot be adequately addressed by an exclusively military response.4
Dynamic threats, such as terrorism, organized crime, failed States or regional
conflicts resulting in new ‘security gaps’, call for a multi-instrumental approach,
not only deploying military, but also civilian capabilities.5 Civilian crisis man-
agement by EU missions has been one response to address new ‘security gaps’
and figures as a central tool of European external politics today.6 With their
unique focus on the provision of public security by means of strengthening ci-
vilian capabilities, such as police or rule of law institutions, EU civilian missions
attempt to address ‘security gaps’ that cannot be remedied by the sole employ-
ment of military capabilities.7
Territories’ (MPEPIL 2010) 5http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1297?rskey¼oaXvu9&result¼1&prd¼EPIL4ac-
cessed 18 May 2015; C Stahn, ‘UN Transitional Administrations in Kosovo and East
Timor: A First Analysis’ (2001) 5 Max Planck UNYB 103; R Wilde, ‘From Danzig to
East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration’ (2001)
95 AJIL 583; R Wolfrum, ‘International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by
the United Nations and Other International Actors’ (2005) 9 Max Planck UNYB 649;
B Knoll, The Legal Status of Territories Subject to Administration by International
Organizations (CUP 2008); C Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial
Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond (CUP 2008); R Wilde, International
Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went
Away (OUP 2008).
3 For an overview of the ongoing EU civilian missions see5http://www.eeas.europa.eu/
csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm4 accessed 18 May 2015. For a detailed
analysis of EU civilian missions see P Koutrakos, The EU Common Security and
Defence Policy (OUP 2013) 133–82.
4 European Security Strategy, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ (2003) 75http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf4 accessed 18 May 2015.
5 ibid 11. See also S Keukeleire and T Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European
Union (Palgrave and Macmillan 2014) 181–5 (on the civilian dimension of the
Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU).
6 M Kaldor, ‘The EU as a New Form of Political Authority: The Example of the
Common Security and Defence Policy’ (2012) 3 Global Policy Volume 79, 82.
Some EU civilian missions place a focus on border security and customs operations
(eg EUBAM Rafah), others on police and justice sector reform (eg EUPOL
Afghanistan).
7 Human Security Study Group, ‘A European Way of Security: The Madrid Report of
the Human Security Study Group Comprising a Proposal and Background Report’
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Some EU civilian missions are explicitly framed as ‘rule of law’-exporting
missions.8 While there is an intuitive connection between the ‘rule of law’
(RoL) and ‘public security’, the particular design of EU ‘rule of law’-exporting
missions is more complex. The foundational idea of such missions is the follow-
ing: the RoL and the provision of law-based procedures for social cooperation
and conflict resolution cater to public security. The existence of public security,
in turn, is considered a condition of interstate peace, as a large number of grave
conflicts today are rooted in domestic tensions and violence. The idea that the
RoL and international peace are connected can be traced back primarily to
Immanuel Kant, who proclaimed that republican states will form a pacific
union and refrain from engaging in war with each other as a result of their
particular civil constitution.9 In more recent times, the Kantian approach has
been recast as the idea of ‘liberal peace’, ie the belief that ‘perfect’ (State and
societal) institutions (democratic government, liberal economy, RoL-based legal
system) lead to international peace and security.10 Jack Levy, for example, is
famously known for stating that “the absence of war between democracies
comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international rela-
tions”.11 The idea of liberal peace also constitutes a philosophical foundation for
EU civilian missions: RoL-abiding institutions can be established with the sup-
port of the European mission that cater to public security domestically and to
international peace.
The main argument made by the article is this: if the idea of EU civilian mis-
sions is to ‘export’ the RoL, the mission must—depending on its mandate—adopt
a complex, hybrid approach to the RoL. The hybridity results from a ‘double’
application of the idea of liberal peace. First, the RoL serves as a policy-tool to
establish and maintain public security and, consequently, international peace. The
idea is to rebuild or establish RoL-conforming (security) structures and institu-
tions (such as police, public prosecutor’s office and courts). This is in line with the
idea of liberal peace as applied to a post-conflict society. Second, the RoL serves as
(Madrid, 8 November 2007) 125 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/40207/1/A_European_Way_
of_Security(author).pdf4 accessed 18 May 2015.
8 EUJUST LEX-Iraq, the European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq
(completed by 31 December 2013) or EUJUST THEMIS, the Rule of Law Mission to
Georgia (completed by 14 July 2005).
9 I Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch’ in H Reiss (ed), Kant: Political
Writings (2nd edn, CUP 1997) 93, 99–100. M Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics’
(1986) 80 American Political Science Rev 1151, 1157f. (expounding Kant’s discussion
of the implications of juridical freedom).
10 On the concept of liberal peace see BJ Ryan, Statebuilding and Police Reform: The
Framework of Security (Routledge 2011) 3; J Mac Millan, On Liberal Peace:
Democracy, War and the International Order (Tauris Academic Studies 1998).
There is a growing quantitative literature on the link between the quality of domestic
institutions and international security, for an overview see, ED Mansfield and JC
Pevehouse, ‘Quantitative Approaches’ in C Reuss-Smit and D Snidal (eds), The
Oxford Handbook of International Relations (OUP 2010) 481, 488–91.
11 J Levy, ‘Domestic Politics and War’ (1988) 18 J Interdisciplinary History 653, 688.
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a constraint on the EU mission itself. According to the idea of liberal peace, the
mission itself is a ‘perfectible institution’ that must be construed with regard to the
liberal ideals, among which the RoL has a prominent place. Underlying the latter
argument is the belief that all institutions (domestic or international) can harm
individuals. Just by being an ‘international’ creation, an institution is not dignified
or immunized, but (depending on the robustness of the mission’s mandate) must
itself be tested against the values or principles that it seeks to export or defend. In
sum, we propose that the RoL in EU civilian missions does not merely serve as a
policy-instrument or good that can be exported, but that the RoL serves as a legal
constraint on the mission itself.
This article examines both functions of the RoL in the context of the EU Rule
of Law Mission to Kosovo (EULEX). Initially employed in 2008, EULEX is the
largest EU civilian mission to date.12 It succeeded the UN Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK), which had been created by the Security Council under Chapter
VII.13 The civilian mission of EULEX is used as a tool to bridge the security
gap threatening the stability of Kosovo and the whole region as a result of the
Kosovo War.14 To fulfil this complex task, EULEX’s mandate contains exten-
sive powers to reform Kosovo’s public security institutions. At the same time,
EULEX is the only EU civilian mission at present endowed with its own execu-
tive tasks, thus replacing, or at least complementing, the State authorities in
certain areas. Given its unique structure, the hybridity of the RoL as both a
constraint and as a policy-tool can be studied.
The question addressed in this article is whether the EU hybrid approach to
the RoL offers a normatively desirable mechanism to bridge the security gaps
that often arise from post-conflict scenarios. The article is structured as follows:
the first part describes the conceptual framework, defining the two main con-
cepts used in the article, ‘authority’ and the ‘RoL’, and discusses them in the
context of EU civilian missions. The second part addresses the problem of RoL
as a constraint on EULEX. The third part deals with the RoL as an instrument
of EULEX to advance public security. The article concludes that the hybrid
approach to the RoL gives rise to high expectations concerning the performance
of EU civilian missions as external ‘civilizers’. However, since both functions of
the RoL are connected, an inadequately developed and implemented constraint-
12 H Dijkstra, ‘The Planning and Implementation of the Rule of Law Mission of the
European Union in Kosovo’ (2011) 5 J Intervention and Statebuilding 193.
13 E de Wet, ‘The Governance of Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244 and the
Establishment and Functioning of EULEX’ (2009) 103 AJIL 83.
14 A Biava, ‘The Emergence of a Strategic Culture within the Common Security and
Defence Policy’ (2011) 16 European Foreign Affairs Review 41, 46. The non-executive
nature of an EU civilian mission is usually mentioned explicitly in the mandate. See,
e.g., Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP of 30 May 2007 on the Establishment of the
European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGANISTAN) [2007] OJ L
139/33, art 4(2); Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP of 12 June 2007 on the European
Union Police Mission undertaken in the Framework of Reform of the Security Sector
(SSR) and its Interface with the System of Justice in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) [2007] OJ L 151/46, art 2(2).
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function of the RoL for EU civilian missions has negative repercussions on a
mission’s ability to rely on the RoL as a policy-tool. Ultimately, insufficiencies of
the constraint-function of the RoL may endanger the success of the mission.
2. Authority of EU Civilian Missions and the Rule of Law
Civilian missions are a central instrument of the EU’s Common Security and
Defence Policy and manifest the EU’s ambition to emerge as a ‘civilizer’ on the
global level.15 The following part clarifies two concepts central to the question
raised in this article, ‘authority’ and the ‘RoL’.
A. Types of Authority Exercised by EU Civilian Missions
EU civilian missions exercise specific types of ‘authority’. The concept of ‘au-
thority’ is of an explanatory value insofar as it captures the circumstances trig-
gering constitutional concerns, among others, the principle of the RoL. For the
purpose of this article, we adopt a normative conception of ‘authority’: authority
in a normative sense means ‘legitimate authority’ as opposed to ‘factual’ or
‘brute’ power.16 Drawing on a definition by Bogdandy et al, ‘authority’ means
the legitimate capacity of one person to unilaterally alter or impact the conduct
or legal position of others.17 EU civilian missions may exercise three different
types of authority: they usually exercise ‘political authority’ when charged with
advisory or even (binding) correctional functions in relation to governments and
governmental acts. They may exercise ‘public authority’ when taking (unilat-
eral) binding decisions vis-a`-vis private individuals and entities on foreign ter-
ritory,18 and ‘institutional authority’ by means of organizational acts affecting
15 See Council of the European Union, Abstract of the 2009 Annual Report on the
Identification and Implementation of Lessons and Best Practices in Civilian CSDP
Missions (11 December 2009) 17487/09.
16 See T Christiano, ‘Authority’5http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority/4 accessed
18 May 2015; B Peters and J Karlsson Schaffer, ‘The Turn to Authority Beyond
States’ (2013) 4 Transnational Legal Theory 315–35.
17 A von Bogdandy, P Dann and M Goldmann, ‘Developing the Publicness of Public
International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities’ in
A von Bogdandy and others (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by International
Institutions (Springer 2010) 3, 11.
18 A von Bogdandy, P Dann and M Goldmann were among the first to propose that
there is in fact such a thing as ‘international public authority’. See von Bogdandy,
Dann and Goldmann, ibid 3. In contrast to von Bogdandy et al, our definition of
‘public authority’ is narrower. We reserve the concept for vertical relationships, invol-
ving at least one non-state actor. In our view ‘public authority’ is not exercised in
horizontal state-to-state relations (even if, in exceptional circumstances, a state or
supranational organization may be authorized to take binding decisions upon another
state).
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third parties, eg when acting as a public employer or public contractor on the
market.19
B. External Exercise of Public Authority as a Rule of Law Problem
How does the exercise of public authority by EU civilian missions implicate the
RoL? From a constitutionalist perspective, it is an enduring inheritance of lib-
eralism that the exercise of public (ie coercive, unilateral) authority vis-a`-vis
individuals must be restricted by constitutional principles, including the
RoL.20 The necessity to check and restrain public power does not end when it
is exercised by, or shared with, international or regional actors.21 Once the ter-
ritorial State opens up its ‘sovereignty shield’ and allows international or re-
gional actors to exercise public authority on its behalf, or where it is required to
do so by international law, the RoL as a constitutional principle is implied.
On the level of positive law, the principle of the RoL has been firmly estab-
lished for EU internal relations. In 1986, the RoL was recognized as a constitu-
tional principle of the EU in the landmark decision Les Verts.22 The Treaty on
European Union (TEU)—as a ‘constitutional document’ of the EU—makes
explicit reference to the RoL at various points.23 The situation is less clear,
however, with regard to EU external relations, ie acts of EU organs in non-
Member States. Article 21(1) TEU holds that the EU shall be ‘guided by’ and
seek to ‘advance’ the RoL in its external actions.24 While the text of the TEU
appears to establish rather mild constitutional obligations for EU civilian mis-
sions, it cannot be doubted that the EU must also be bound by RoL-principles
when exercising public authority ‘abroad’. It cannot make a difference where
EU organs exercise public authority for the RoL to be implied.25 Any deviation
19 Note that this is an ideal-type distinction only. In practice, it may prove difficult to
distinguish among the three types of authority. See Human Rights Review Panel
(HRRP), Kristian Kahrs v EULEX (2013) 2012-16, para 30 (on the distinction be-
tween political and public power of EULEX). On the HRRP see sub-Section III.C
20 M Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP 2003) 42–45.
21 This rationale informs the reasoning of the Bosphorus case. See Bosphorus v IRL App
no 45036/98 (ECtHR, 30 June 2005), para 153.
22 Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23.
23 TEU [2012] OJ C326/13, Preamble (paras 2 and 4), art 2, arts 21(1) and (2)(b). See
also the indirect references in TEU art 7 (serious breach of the values of art 2) and art
49 TEU (accession to EU).
24 TEU [2012] OJ C326/13 art 21(1) reads in full: ‘“The Union’s action on the interna-
tional scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation,
development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: dem-
ocracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity,
and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.’”
25 ILA, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations’ in
International Law Association Report of the Sixty-Third Session (Geneva 2011)
(International Law Association, Geneva 2011), art 3-4.
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from the general rule—that the RoL applies to any exercise of public authority
by the EU—would have to be justified. A mere lack of resources or the (un-
qualified) reference to a tense public security situation, eg cannot—in our
view—justify a deviation of EU external action from RoL-principles. This, in
turn, implies that EULEX Kosovo, in so far as it exercises public authority, must
adhere to the RoL already by virtue of EU constitutional law.
When does EULEX exercise public authority? In 2008, EULEX took over
UNMIK’s tasks in the field of police and justice.26 Whereas United Nations
Security Council Resolution (UNSC Res) 1244 had established ‘an interna-
tional civil and security presence in Kosovo with full civil and political author-
ity and sole responsibility for the governance of Kosovo’,27 EULEX only
retains ‘certain executive responsibilities’.28 The exercise of executive power
by EULEX is a clear case of ‘public authority’, as defined above, since the
mission has the legal capacity to take binding, unilateral decisions on individ-
uals. EULEX is entrusted with the exercise of public authority in four distinct
contexts: first, EULEX has executive powers with regard to public security,
relating primarily to the police, the office of the public prosecutor and cus-
toms.29 Second, EULEX has adjudicative powers in relation to specific crimes
(war crimes, terrorism, organized crime, corruption etc.).30 Third, EULEX
may reverse or annul operational decisions taken by the Kosovo authorities
(corrective powers).31 Fourth, there is a broad provision in EULEX’s man-
date, holding that EULEX shall ‘assume other responsibilities, independently
(. . .) to ensure the maintenance and promotion of the RoL, public order and
security, in consultation with the relevant Council agencies’ (subsidiary
power).32
26 Ruhan Ruhani v UNMIK (13 April 2011) Case no 85/09, para 12.
27 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403 para 97.
28 Council Joint Action 2008/124 of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of
Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo [2008] OJ L42/92, art 2. On the limited
scope of EULEX’s executive mandate see also the decision of the HRRP, H & G
against EULEX (2013) 2012-19 and 2012-20, para 41.
29 EULEX operational power is based on Council Joint Action 2008/124 (n 23) arts 3(h),
6(3)(b) and (d), 6(4). See also Law on Jurisdiction and Competencies of EULEX
Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo (2008, Law on Jurisdiction) law no 03/L-053, arts
7–13, 17; the Law on Police (2011) law no 04/L-076; Customs and Excise Code of
Kosovo (2008) law no 03/L-109, art 310 as amended by Law on Amending and
Supplementing the Laws related to the Mandate of the European Union Rule of
Law Mission in the Republic of Kosovo (2014) law no 04/L-273.
30 Council Joint Action 2008/124 (n 28) art 3(d). See also Law on Jurisdiction (n 29) arts
2–6.
31 Council Joint Action 2008/124 ibid art 3(b). See, eg HRRP, Bahadur ao v EULEX
(2011) 2011-02, para 46 (inadmissible).
32 Council Joint Action 2008/124 ibid art 3(h).
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C. Conceptions of the Rule of Law
EU constitutional law does not provide any guidance as to what conception of
the RoL EU civilian missions are obliged to follow. In the literature, three RoL-
conceptions are predominantly discussed: a formal, a substantive and a func-
tional understanding of the RoL. We argue that—in relation to external EU
action—a functional RoL-conception should apply.
The formal understanding of the RoL originates in England in the 18th cen-
tury and focuses on (technical) restrictions to the exercise of governmental
power, such as ‘rule by law’, ‘supremacy of the law’, ‘equality before the law’,
‘formal legality’, ‘open government’ and others.33 Some have argued that Article
2 TEU contains a formal understanding as it explicitly distinguishes the RoL
from other constitutional principles, such as democracy and human rights.34 This
argument, however, seems too formalistic in our view.
The substantive interpretation of the RoL is often associated with the German
idea of the ‘Rechtsstaat’ and incorporates the idea of ‘good’ law into the definition
by demanding conformity of a legal system with ideals such as democracy, human
rights or—even more abstractly—justice and reason.35 There are good reasons to
believe that the EU follows a substantive conception of the RoL. Pech has argued
that the EU ‘constitution’, viewed as a whole, suggests that the Union’s founda-
tional principles are interdependent and must be construed in light of each other.36
Similarly, the recently published Commission Framework, which seeks to resolve
future threats to the RoL in EU Member States, explicitly states that the RoL-
principles developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Venice Commission ‘are not
purely formal and procedural requirements’, but that ‘they are the vehicle for
ensuring compliance with and respect for democracy and human rights’.37
33 See S Chesterman, ‘Rule of Law’ (MPEPIL 2007) 5http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.
1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1676?rskey¼DpepX5&result¼1&prd¼
EPIL4 accessed 18 May 2015, para 2.
34 See, with further references, A von Bogdandy and M Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency
in the Rule of Law: What It Is, What Has Been Done, What Can Be Done’ (2014) 51
Common Market L Rev 59, 62–63.
35 For an instructive overview of different rule of law conceptions see, eg P Craig,
‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical
Framework’ (1997) Public Law 467 or T Brian, On the Rule of Law: History,
Politics, Theory (CUP 2004) 91–114.
36 L Pech, ‘A Union Founded on the Rule of Law: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of
Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’ (2010) 6 EuConst 359, 368. See also,
more recent, L Pech, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: On the EU’s Limited
Contribution to the Shaping of an International Understanding of the Rule of Law’
in D Kochenov and F Amtenbrink (eds), European Union’s Shaping of the
International Legal Order (CUP 2014) 111f, 118.
37 Commission Communication, A new Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law (11
March 2014) COM 2014 4. Pech claims that the EU has formally recognized the
Council of Europe’s pre-eminence in shaping an original understanding of the rule
of law within Europe. The references of the Commission Communication to the case
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According to the document, the RoL is a constitutional principle with both formal
and substantive components (as substantiated in the case law of the CJEU and the
ECtHR). Besides ‘formal’ criteria (legality, legal certainty, prohibition of arbitrari-
ness, independent and impartial courts as well as equality before the law), the
framework adds ‘effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights’
to the definition of the RoL.38 In the ‘EU Concept for CSDP Justice Missions’, the
EU decided to follow the substantive RoL-definition of the UN Secretary
General.39 In practice, the EU has thus accepted a substantive RoL-conception
for its external actions.
Finally, there is a functional conception of the RoL. On this account, no fixed
(substantive or formal) content can be attached to the RoL. The RoL is con-
sidered to be of no intrinsic value as such, but serves other constitutional prin-
ciples or goals. According to Chesterman, a functional approach looks at the
function that the RoL is intended to serve in a given society.40 Thus, according
to a functional understanding, the RoL caters to the realization of other ideals,
such as the prevention of arbitrary government, ensuring human rights-conform-
ity of executive action, fostering stable economic development or the non-vio-
lent solution of political disputes.41
We endorse a functional conception of the RoL for EU civilian missions. The
content of the RoL with regard to external EU actions is dynamic, not fixed. It is
determined by taking into account the type of authority a mission exercises.
What the RoL requires depends on the type of authority (public, political, or
institutional) the EU exercises in the individual case. For example, if a EU
civilian mission exercises ‘public authority’ (where the RoL has the function
to constrain such acts), the RoL serves ideals such as preventing arbitrary rule
law of the ECtHR and the documents of the Venice Commission make sense in this
light. Pech, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad’ (n 36) 120f.
38 ibid 4.
39 Council document 18173/10 of 20 December 2010 laying down the EU concept for
CSDP justice missions (EU concept for CSDP justice missions) [2002], para 3.1.
Reference is made, ie to the UN definition of the rule of law in the UNSC ‘Report
of the Secretary-General: The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-
conflict societies’ (2004) UN Doc S/2004/616 [6]: ‘[Rule of law] refers to a principle of
governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including
the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally
enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international
human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence
to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the
law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in de-
cision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal
transparency.’
40 S Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 Am J Comp L 331, 341.
41 ibid 341. Clarifying the distinction between a functional and a substantive approach,
he states that resorting to the rule of law as a means to realize certain substantive
goals does not mean that one applies a substantive rule of law conception. ibid 344.
Wennerstro¨m also discusses a functional approach to the rule of law. E Wennerstro¨m,
The Rule of Law and the European Union (Iustus Fo¨rlag Uppsala 2007) 82f.
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and ensuring human rights-conformity of executive action. Given this function,
the RoL essentially requires legal and institutional safeguards (eg access to ju-
dicial review) benefiting individual, non-state addressees of public authority acts.
In contrast, where EULEX exercises ‘political authority’ (where the RoL has
the function of a policy-tool), the RoL serves ideals such as public security or
stable economic development. In this case, the RoL requires, eg accountability
mechanisms or instruments to prevent corruption benefiting the overall political
situation in the territory.
3. Rule of Law as a Constraint to EULEX
This part deals with the first aspect of the EU hybrid approach: the RoL as a
constraint to the exercise of public authority by EULEX. How is the constrain-
ing-function of the RoL implemented in the case of EULEX? In order to mean-
ingfully assess EULEX’s RoL-performance, one needs to distinguish specific
RoL-requirements that are designed to prevent arbitrary rule and ensure the
human rights-conformity of executive action by EULEX. To formulate specific
RoL-requirements, we draw on a recent approach by Bedner who has proposed
a ‘research tool’, differentiating three categories of RoL-requirements: the first
category relates to ‘procedural elements’ (eg rule by law and formal legality),
the second concerns ‘substantive elements’ (eg protection of individual rights
and liberties) and the third pertains to ‘controlling mechanisms’ (eg independent
tribunals and courts).42 The constraining function of the RoL for EU civilian
missions is a crucial factor in guaranteeing that the EU is locally and interna-
tionally perceived as a legitimate actor in the provision of security.43 As outlined
in the introduction, the notion of the RoL as a constraint follows from the
application of the idea of liberal peace to the mission itself.
A. Procedural Requirements
Taking into account that EULEX exercises ‘public authority’, two procedural
requirements of the RoL are particularly important: the ‘rule by law’ and
‘formal legality’.44 As applied to EULEX, ‘rule by law’ requires a constitutional
framework that defines the conduct of the mission’s organs. EULEX’s legal
42 A Bedner, ‘An Elementary Approach to the Rule of Law’ (2010) 2 Hague J the Rule
of L 48, 56–63, 63–67, 67–70.
43 Human Security Study Group (2007), ‘A European Way of Security: The Madrid
Report of the Human Security Study Group Comprising a Proposal and
Background Report’ (Madrid, 8 November 2007) 45http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/40207/1/
A_European_Way_of_Security(author).pdf4 accessed 18 May 2015.
44 This is, of course, not to be understood as a comprehensive list of the constitutive
elements of the procedural dimension of the rule of law. Bedner adds two further
elements, namely that ‘all state action must be subjected to the law’ and ‘democracy’,
the examination of which lies outside the scope of this article, see ibid.
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capacity to exercise public authority is determined by a constitutional frame-
work of international, European and, arguably, Kosovar constitutional law.
EULEX formally operates in the framework of UNSC Res 1244.45 From a
RoL-perspective, the consequences of EULEX’s submission to UNSC Res 1244
are drastic: due to the requirement of neutrality regarding Kosovo’s status, the
EU is formally not authorized to engage in state-building activities. ‘Status-
neutrality’ implies that EULEX has to adhere to the UNMIK body of law
when carrying out its executive mandate. This, however, would exclude the
laws of Kosovo established under the new Constitution of Kosovo
(Constitution) after its independence.46 Consequently, EULEX officials would
be barred from applying those Kosovar laws they helped drafting (and which
were given democratic legitimacy by the Kosovo legislature).47 In practice,
EULEX tends to ignore this legal implication.48 Regarding EULEX’s basis in
EU constitutional law, the mission was established under Article 14 TEU (post-
Lisbon Article 28 TEU) and Article 25(3) TEU (post-Lisbon Article 38(3)
TEU).49 The mission is carried out within the framework of the Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), a largely intergovernmental field of EU
action, which leads to limited judicial review50 and minimal involvement of the
European Parliament.51 From a RoL-perspective, both result in a reduced ac-
countability of the EU in this policy field.52 Lastly, Kosovar constitutional law is
relevant since it defines the space in which the (new) Kosovar state has opened
up its ‘sovereignty shield’ and integrated the exercise of public authority by
international actors into its domestic legal order.53 The Constitution mentions
EULEX only once.54 However, EULEX may be regarded as an ‘other actor
mandated under the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement’
45 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo of 24 November 2008’ (2008) UN Doc S/2008/
692, para 50.
46 W Koeth, ‘State Building without a State: The EU’s Dilemma in Defining Its
Relations with Kosovo’ (2010) 15 Eur Foreign Affairs Rev 227, 238 (pointing to the
fact that UNMIK, after Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, ceased to
promulgate all primary and secondary legislation by Kosovo institutions).
47 ibid.
48 ibid.
49 Council Joint Action 2008/124 (n 28).
50 See TEU [2012] OJ C326/13 art 24(1) in conjunction with the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) OJ C326/55, art 275.
51 TEU [2012] OJ C326/13 art 36.
52 B van Vooren and RA Wessel, EU External Relations Law (CUP 2014) 375–79.
53 The relevance of Kosovar constitutional law for EULEX may be questionable if one
considers UNSC Res 1244 as the sole (international law) basis of the European mis-
sion. Given the constitutional reality of the Kosovar state, however, this position does
not seem tenable to us anymore. See R Muharremi, ‘The European Union Rule of
Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) from the Perspective of Kosovo Constitutional
Law’ (2010) 70 Zao¨RV 357.
54 Constitution of 7 April 2008 art 151(2) 5http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/
?cid¼2,3024 accessed 18 May 2015.
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(Ahtisaari Plan)55 with which ‘all authorities in the Republic of Kosovo shall
cooperate fully’ and to whose ‘decisions or acts’ they ‘shall (. . .) give effect’.56
The Ahtisaari Plan refers to the ‘European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
Mission’ in Annex X.57 The Constitution, thus, endows EULEX with constitu-
tional status, taking precedence over all legal provisions, which, arguably, in-
cludes the Constitution itself.58
Another procedural element of importance when restraining public authority
is the ‘principle of legality’.59 The principle of formal legality is often considered
to entail (at least) three sub-requirements: that acts of a ‘public authority’ must
have a legal basis, that the legal basis be accessible and that the wording must be
sufficiently clear.60 The executive tasks of EULEX in the field of policing, justice
and customs are based on its mandate.61 In addition, EULEX officials are
required to respect the applicable local laws. This obligation flows from
Article 41(1) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, which
applies to EULEX personnel as an international legal obligation.62 This provi-
sion, however, is unenforceable as a result of the privileges and immunities
granted to EULEX.63
There has also been criticism with regard to the insufficiently clear framing of
EULEX’s public authority-powers. One problem is the ambiguity of the different
55 UNSC ‘Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Addendum to
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President
of the Security Council’ (2007) UN Doc S/2007/168/Add 1 (Ahtisaari Plan).
56 Constitution (n 54) art 146(1) and (2).
57 Ahtisaari Plan (n 55).
58 According to Constitution art 143(2) and art 143(3), the Ahtisaari Plan takes prece-
dence over all laws in Kosovo, which includes the Constitution. In turn, the Ahtisaari
Plan explicitly provides for the presence of the international community in Kosovo.
59 Bedner (n 42) 60–62.
60 For Raz, laws further need to be prospective, adequately publicized and not be
changed too often. J Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ in J Raz (ed), The
Authority of Law (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 214. For Fuller, legality additionally requires
that rules are constant through time, intelligible, only demand the possible, consistent
with one another, known to the citizen and observed by the legal actors charged with
their administration according to their annunciation. L Fuller, The Morality of Law
(New Haven, revised edn, YUP 1969) 46–91.
61 Council Joint Action 2008/124 (n 28) art 3.
62 According to M Spernbauer, UNMIK Reg no 2000/47 ‘on the status, privileges and
immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and their personnel in Kosovo’ also applies to
EULEX based on UNMIK executive decision UNMIK Reg no 2008/36. M
Spernbauer, EU Peacebuilding in Kosovo and Afghanistan (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 2014) 354 n 1538. Section 3.5 of UNMIK Reg no 2000/47 states that
UNMIK personnel shall respect the laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo in
the fulfilment of their mandate . . . and refrain from any action or activity incompatible
therewith. The same, consequently, applies to EULEX personnel.
63 Law on the Status, Immunities and Privileges of Diplomatic and Consular Missions
and Personnel in Republic of Kosova and of the International Military Presence and
its Personnel (2008) law no 03/L-033 or, based on international law, UNMIK Reg no
2000/47 ‘on the status, privileges and immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and their
personnel in Kosovo’, which equally applies to EULEX personnel.
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language versions of the reverse and annulment-power as to whether prior con-
sultation of the relevant international civilian authorities is mandatory or discre-
tionary for EULEX.64 Another problem is the broad wording of EULEX’s
subsidiary power.65 Additionally, one of the central planning documents of the
mission, the Operation Plan (OPLAN),66 is a restricted document, giving rise to
concerns with regard to the accessibility of the legal basis and the transparency of
EULEX. The greatest concern in the context of formal legality, however, is the
amalgamation of international, European and Kosovar law. All of these legal
regimes interact when EULEX’s ‘public authority’ is at stake. Given this com-
plex interplay of legal regimes in Kosovo, it is not surprising that some qualify ‘its
legal framework, which is an unclear and inconsistent mix of former Yugoslav,
UNMIK and more recent legislation’ as a central problem.67
B. Substantive Requirements
A substantive RoL-requirement is the conformity of all laws and legal acts with
human rights.68 The exercise of public authority demands compliance with
human rights and there is no reason to treat EU internal or external action
differently in this regard. Its mandate requires EULEX to ‘ensure that all its
activities respect international standards concerning human rights and gender
mainstreaming’ without, however, specifying these.69 In its jurisprudence, the
HRRP regularly refers to the obligation of EULEX to comply with interna-
tional standards of human rights.70 These ‘international standards’ are primarily
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and UNSC Res 1325
(2000) on Women, Peace and Security.71 A look at the practice of the HRRP
confirms that the Panel predominantly relies on the ECHR.72 To this, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union can be added.73
64 M Spernbauer, ‘EULEX Kosovo: The Difficult Deployment and Challenging
Implementation of the Most Comprehensive Civilian EU Operation to Date’ (2010)
11 German LJ 769, 785.
65 Council Joint Action 2008/124 (n 28) art 3(h).
66 According to ibid art 4(4), the EU Planning Team draws up the OPLAN while the
Council approves the document. The OPLAN contains central information regarding
EULEX’s structure and operationalization. See, eg ibid arts 6(3) and 14(5).
67 E Schleicher, Positive Peace in Kosovo (Peter Lang 2012) 130.
68 Bedner (n 37) 63–67.
69 Council Joint Action 2008/124 (n 23) art 3(i).
70 HRRP, H & G against EULEX (2013) 2012-19 and 2012-20, para 42. On the HRRP
see sub-Section III.C.
71 Spernbauer, ‘EULEX Kosovo’ (n 64) 786.
72 HRRP Annual Report 2014, 9,5http://www.hrrp.eu/annual-report.php4 accessed 18
May 2015.
73 EU concept for CSDP justice missions (n 39) 10 (which additionally mentions inter-
national standards contained in international human rights law, international humani-
tarian law, international criminal law and international refugee law).
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Even though the Kosovar Constitution as such does not create enforceable
obligations for EULEX, one can argue that the Kosovar government has a
subsidiary duty to ensure that the practice of EULEX remains within the bound-
aries of the Constitution. The Constitution in Chapter II contains a comprehen-
sive catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms. Additionally, eight
international human rights instruments are directly applicable in Kosovo, ac-
cording to Article 22. Article 3 of the Constitution guarantees that the exercise
of public authority in Kosovo ‘shall be based upon the principles of equality of
all individuals before the law and with full respect for internationally recognized
fundamental rights and freedoms.’ EULEX exercises such public authority in
Kosovo. If the Kosovar parliament ratifies an international agreement that dele-
gates State powers to EULEX according to Article 20(1) of the Constitution,74
one may argue that the responsibility to ensure that EULEX respects funda-
mental rights and freedoms, as enshrined in the Constitution, rests with the
Kosovar government itself. A similar idea is captured in international law
when the ECtHR holds states responsible under Article 1 ECHR for all acts
and omissions of their organs, even if acting in compliance with international
legal obligations.75 A Member State cannot free itself from its (human rights)
obligations by opening up its sovereignty shield and allowing international
actors to perform acts of public authority on its territory.76 In other words,
the Kosovar government is required to ensure that all legal acts of EULEX
remain within the limits of the Kosovar Constitution.
C. Controlling Requirements
The last RoL-requirement essential to constraining the exercise of public au-
thority concerns controlling mechanisms that allow for an ‘authoritative deter-
mination’ of whether laws have been broken.77 A functional RoL-approach
demands a sufficient form of judicial review of public authority acts by
EULEX. Unfortunately, the mission exhibits deficiencies in this regard.
In 2006, the UNMIK Human Rights Advisory Panel (HRAP) was estab-
lished.78 In 2009, the EU installed a similar body, the HRRP, to review acts
74 See Law on Ratification of the International Agreement between the Republic of
Kosovo and the European Union on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in
Kosovo (2014) law no 04/L-274.
75 Bosphorus v IRL (n 21) 153. Kosovo is not a formal member of the Council of
Europe, but its Constitution declares the ECHR (and, arguably, the case-law of the
ECtHR) to be directly applicable in Kosovo, see art 22(2) of the Constitution.
76 A Peters and T Altwicker, Europa¨ische Menschenrechtskonvention (CH Beck 2012)
17.
77 That the rule of law demands something like courts is claimed by J Waldron, ‘The
Concept and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 Georgia L Rev 1, 20–21.
78 UNMIK Reg no 2006/12 of 23 March 2006 established the Human Rights Advisory
Panel, which was the first international body to receive individual complaints against
an UN Administration.
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of EULEX.79 The HRRP has jurisdiction to review alleged human rights vio-
lations by EULEX Kosovo in the conduct of its executive mandate.80 The panel
is not a court in the sense of Article 6 ECHR as it does not have the power to
normatively alter the complainant’s legal position.81 It may only establish a
human rights violation and make recommendations to the EULEX’s Head of
Mission for remedial action (apart from compensation).82 Given the limited
judicial review through the HRRP established by the EU, Nolte and Aust
argued that ‘the EU is not prepared to subject itself to the same standards of
binding judicial review which it requires, for example, of candidates as a condi-
tion for joining the Union’.83 Similarly, the Venice Commission concluded that
EULEX’s supportive and corrective acts should be put under a more stringent
review in a generally peaceful situation, as opposed to the initial post-conflict
emergency context.84
4. Rule of Law as a Policy-Tool to Establish Public Security
The last part discusses the second aspect of the EU hybrid approach, according
to which the RoL serves as a policy-tool to establish and maintain public secur-
ity85 in post-conflict scenarios.86 The choice of the RoL as a tool to establish
public security in Kosovo directly results from Article 21 TEU, which counts the
RoL among the principles that shall guide the Union’s action on the interna-
tional scene and that it shall seek to advance in the wider world. It also reflects
the conviction that the RoL is imperative for the establishment of sustainable
security. The employment of the RoL as a policy-tool to advance public security
in Kosovo is further evidenced by the mission statement establishing EULEX to
assist Kosovo in the path towards sustainable stability.87 The use of the RoL as a
79 The legal basis establishing the HRRP is a restricted document. See Venice
Commission Opinion no 545/2009 ‘On the Existing Mechanisms to Review the
Compatibility with Human Rights Standards of Acts by UNMIK and EULEX
Kosovo’ (2010) CDL-AD 051, para 53 no 17 (Venice Commission Accountability
Opinion).
80 HRRP Rules of Procedure (HRRP RoP) r 25(1)5http://www.hrrp.eu/reference-docu-
ments.php4 accessed 10 June 2014.
81 On the criteria see Peters and Altwicker (n 76) 145.
82 HRRP RoP (n 80) r 34.
83 G Nolte and H Ph Aust, ‘European Execptionalism?’ (2013) 2 Global
Constitutionalism 407, 421.
84 Venice Commission Accountability Opinion (n 79) para 58.
85 TEU [2012] OJ C326/13 art 42(1) authorizes the EU to employ civilian missions
outside the Union for the purposes of peace-keeping, conflict prevention and the
strengthening of international security. TEU art 43(1) further explains that the
tasks referred to in art 42(1) include, among others, post-conflict stabilization.
86 This applies to rule of law substitution missions. Council, Comprehensive EU Concept
for Missions in the Field of Rule of Law in Crisis Management, Council doc 9792/03,
4f. See also EU concept for CSDP justice missions (n 39) 20.
87 Council Joint Action 2008/124 (n 28) preamble, para 7.
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policy-instrument to establish public security is implied by the exercise of ‘pol-
itical authority’. EULEX’s mandate authorizes the exercise of ‘political author-
ity’ at various points. Generally, EULEX shall monitor, mentor and advise the
competent Kosovo institutions on all areas related to the wider RoL.88
Furthermore, the mission disposes of a police and a customs component to
support and advise local institutions.89 Additionally, EULEX is instructed to
support the judicial sector.90
What are the identified risks to public security that need to be addressed by
EULEX’s political authority? The mandate generally highlights measures
against corruption and organized crime,91 two serious security concerns in the
area.92 Another factor is the implications of Kosovo’s multi-ethnicity, a crucial
driver of the past conflict and a source of serious political tension in present-day
Kosovo. Accordingly, EULEX is to develop and strengthen a multi-ethnic just-
ice system, police and customs service.93
The approach of using the RoL as a tool to advance public security rests on
two assumptions, namely, that the RoL and public security are connected and
that public security can be ‘created’ by improving RoL-standards.
It is commonly assumed that the RoL and public security are connected.94
Precisely how these two concepts relate to each other, however, is not suffi-
ciently clear. First, public security can be viewed as a necessary precondition for
the RoL, ie without public security, the RoL can neither be established nor
maintained. From this perspective, ‘public security’ is understood as a factual
conditio sine qua non for a functioning RoL. This is why the World Justice
Project—when measuring the RoL-performance of states—measures factors
such as ‘crime control’.95 This idea also informed early EU civilian missions
with their focus on the ‘strengthening of local police forces’, which was con-
sidered crucial for reinstalling the RoL.96 Second, the reverse also holds true: a
functioning RoL can be qualified as a necessary condition to create and maintain
public security, ie without RoL-conformity there can be no (or at least
88 ibid art 3(a).
89 ibid art 6(3)(b) and (d).
90 ibid art 3(d).
91 Art 3(e) instructs EULEX to strengthen cooperation and coordination throughout the
whole judicial process, particularly in the area of organized crime; art 3(f) requires the
mission to contribute to the fight against corruption, fraud and financial crime and art
3(g) mandates EULEX to contribute to the implementation of the Kosovo Anti-
Corruption Strategy and Anti-Corruption Action Plan.
92 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Inhuman Treatment of People and
Illicit Trafficking in Human Organs in Kosovo’ (7 January 2011) Dick Marty Report,
doc 12462, para 11.
93 Council Joint Action 2008/124 (n 28) art 2.
94 UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General: An Agenda for Peace’ (1992) UN Doc A/
47/277 [59].
95 That ‘crime is effectively controlled’ is a subitem of Factor 5 ‘Order and Security’ of
the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2014, 8.
96 Similarly, Spernbauer, ‘EULEX Kosovo’ (n 54) 772.
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significantly less) public security.97 UN and EU policy documents require that
public security be attained within a rule of law framework.98 This relationship
between the RoL and security is also why the European Council identified the
strengthening of the rule of law as a necessary concurrent to the strengthening of
police capabilities in EU civilian crisis management.99 The idea is that ‘a demo-
cratically run, accountable and efficient security system helps reduce the risk of
conflict, thus creating an enabling environment for development’.100 This means
that there can be no sustainable security without compliance with RoL-
standards. Consequently, it seems appropriate to view public security and the
RoL as mutually constitutive concepts. On the one hand, the level of public
security on the ground impacts the degree to which one may speak of a system
based on the RoL, ie public security is functionally related to the RoL (func-
tional relation). On the other hand, public security without the RoL is illegit-
imate (normative relation).
The second assumption poses more problems. Can public security actually be
exported by establishing the RoL? Some argue that the international agenda on
public security and the RoL should be separated.101 A first argument relates to a
conceived difference in objectives: while the security agenda relates to the
strengthening of State law enforcement capacities, the RoL-agenda aims at re-
stricting it.102 Another argument in favour of separation is primarily about ef-
ficiency: technical assistance to reform the security sector can be provided by
States and international organizations relatively easily and with measurable suc-
cess, while transformational aspirations—related to normative commitments,
such as the RoL—are considered harder to transplant, generating less tangible
results.103 The RoL is not an easily transplanted commodity. Apart from the
respective institutions, a functioning RoL presupposes, so it is argued, a set of
normative commitments and beliefs about the State and society.104 Some au-
thors therefore caution that there are ‘no short-cuts to developing the RoL; in
97 In this context ‘public security’ is understood in a normative sense: a ‘legitimate’
public security framework is one that builds upon the RoL.
98 See, eg UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General 62/659’ (2008) UN Doc A/62/659 [1]
and EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR), 13 October
2005, 12566/4/05 REV 4, paras 17 and 20.
99 Appendix 3 to the Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council
19 and 20 June 2000.
100 OECD DAC, The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) 13.
101 UC Schro¨der and J Kode, ‘Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform in International
State-Building: Dilemmas of Converging Agendas’ (2012) 4 Hague J Rule of L 31.
102 ibid.
103 ibid 45.
104 ibid 37 (arguing that international rule of law assistance ‘risks degrading rule of law to
a mere institutional blueprint’). This last point reminds of a famous dictum by the
German constitutional lawyer EW Bo¨ckenfo¨rde, who claimed that ‘[t]he liberal, secu-
lar State builds on preconditions the existence of which it cannot guarantee by itself’.
EW Bo¨ckenfo¨rde, Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit (Suhrkamp 1976) 60 (‘Der freiheitliche,
sa¨kularisierte Staat lebt von Voraussetzungen, die er selbst nicht garantieren kann’
[translation by the authors]). Adapted to the situation at issue here, the argument
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any country, the realization of the RoL is the result of protracted struggle by
many people and organizations on many different fronts over a long period of
time’.105 To many, a simple ‘copy and paste-strategy’ of the EU internal RoL-
conception to its external relations, therefore, does not seem appropriate.
There are, however, good reasons in our view to assume that public security,
achieved by means of establishing the RoL, is a ‘good’ that can be exported: on
normative grounds the EU must defend the instrumental relationship between
public security and the RoL, as outlined above, also for its external actions. The
RoL is a necessary corollary of legitimate public security. Public security can
neither be enforced, nor can the security sector be reformed without orientation
on RoL-standards. Furthermore, it would negatively affect the EU’s credibility
as an external actor if it would export standards that lag behind its internal
ambitions.
5. Conclusion: Bridging the Security Gap through an EU Rule of
Law?
Is the EU hybrid approach to the RoL – as a constraint and as a policy-tool – a
promising model to bridge security gaps in post-conflict scenarios? From a nor-
mative perspective, the EU must be applauded for its attempt to bridge the
security gap through a hybrid RoL-approach. The deployment of civilian cap-
abilities, such as EULEX, reflects the EU awareness of security gaps stemming
from a new type of security threat that cannot be addressed by military means
only.106 The destabilizing factors that EULEX confronts in Kosovo, such as
corruption, organized crime and inter-ethnic tensions, cannot be solved with
recourse to military capabilities.
However, it must be observed that deficiencies of one RoL-function will
impact the success of the other as they are closely connected. The effectiveness
of the EU endeavour to export public security hinges on how the EU handles its
own RoL-problems regarding the external exercise of public authority.
Additionally, the fact that Kosovo is integrated in the Stabilization and
Association Process, and therefore a potential candidate for a future EU en-
largement, blurs the line between EU internal and external security, further
strengthening the argument for an effective constraining function of the RoL
to avoid the creation of a ‘legitimacy gap’ while closing the ‘security gap’. EU
civilian missions with a clear executive mandate, such as EULEX, must comply
would be that the necessary preconditions for a functioning rule of law cannot be
‘installed’ by a European civilian mission.
105 R Peerenboom, ‘The Future of Rule of Law: Challenges and Prospects for the Field’
(2009) 1 Hague J Rule of L 5, 14.
106 Human Security Study Group (2007), ‘A European Way of Security: The Madrid
Report of the Human Security Study Group Comprising a Proposal and
Background Report’ (Madrid, 8 November 2007) 235http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/40207/
1/A_European_Way_of_Security(author).pdf4 accessed 18 May 2015.
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with EU RoL-standards in practice. In this regard, EULEX exhibits huge short-
comings, not all of which can be attributed to the precarious situation resulting
from the amalgamation of international, European and Kosovar law.
Eventually, the EU’s success as an external actor may not stumble over the
fact that EULEX did not manage to solve the actual public security problems
of Kosovo, but over its own RoL-deficit.107
There will be demand for robust and comprehensive EU civilian missions
elsewhere in the world. Public security, in ever more places, will depend on
RoL-export. It seems crucial that EU civilian missions, when exercising author-
ity abroad, act according to EU constitutional principles, among which the RoL
is of central importance. Not only must the RoL be exported, it must be lived by
EU civilian missions themselves.
107 See W Koeth, ‘State Building without a State: The EU’s Dilemma in Defining Its
Relations with Kosovo’ (2010) 15 Eur Foreign Affairs Rev 227, 246; R Muharremi,
‘The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) from the
Perspective of Kosovo Constitutional Law’ (2010) 70 Zao¨RV 357, 379.
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